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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE 
Amici curiae are 14 professors of law who have 
devoted much of their teaching and research to the 
area of state taxes and the role of state tax policy in 
our federal system. The names and affiliations (for 
identification purposes only) of amici are included in 
an addendum to this brief.1 The amici are concerned 
with the effect of this Court’s dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence on the development of fair and 
efficient state tax systems. No decision of this Court 
has had more effect on state sales and use tax sys-
tems than Quill Corporation v. North Dakota. We 
believe the Tenth Circuit properly decided the case 
below. But if the Court decides to grant the Direct 
Marketing Association’s petition to review the issue 
of discrimination which it raises, we respectfully re-
quest that the Court also grant the conditional cross-
petition filed by Executive Director Barbara J. Brohl 
of the Colorado Department of Revenue asking the 
Court to reconsider Quill. This brief sets forth the 
reasons for our support of that cross-petition.  
  
                                               
1No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part 
nor made any monetary contribution. Only amici curiae or 
their counsel made any monetary contribution to the prepara-
tion or submission of this brief. Counsel of record for the parties 







SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of 
State of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967), this Court held, 
over a rigorous dissent, that Illinois could not consti-
tutionally require a mail-order seller with no office, 
agents, solicitors or property in the state to collect 
use taxes on its sales. In Quill Corp. v. North Dako-
ta, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), the Court reconsidered this 
holding. North Dakota did not allege that Quill was 
factually distinguishable from Bellas Hess. See Quill, 
504 U.S at 303. Instead, the state took on the harder 
task of arguing that changes in the Court’s Due Pro-
cess and Commerce Clause jurisprudence had made 
Bellas Hess obsolete. Id. at 303-04. The Court agreed 
with North Dakota that both its Due Process and 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence had “evolved sub-
stantially.” Quill, 504 U.S at 307, 309.  
But the Court nevertheless overruled Bellas Hess 
only on Due Process Clause grounds. The Court not 
only sustained Bellas Hess under the Commerce 
Clause, but also breathed new life into its holding—
creating what is now referred to as the “physical 
presence” nexus standard for use tax collection. This 
result can only be explained by the Court’s desire to 
remove due process obstacles to Congressional inter-
vention while protecting the interests of the mail-
order industry under the Commerce Clause. These 
concerns led to an unprecedented bifurcation of the 
standard for state tax jurisdiction or “nexus” be-
tween the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, a 
distinction that has not been extended to other areas 




Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1151 
(10th Cir. 2016)(“DMA II”)(Gorsuch, J. concurring).  
For more than two decades, states like Colorado 
have endeavored without success to adapt the neces-
sities of sales and use tax enforcement to the physi-
cal presence standard, especially in a digital world. 
Now some states are considering another direct chal-
lenge, this time to Quill.2 Indeed, Justice Kennedy 
has stated that the legal system should find the ap-
propriate case to consider a challenge to Quill. See 
Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 
(2015)(Kennedy, J., concurring)(“DMA I”). This 
Court’s precedents are not “sacrosanct;” rather, they 
can be overruled where “the necessity and propriety 
of doing so has been established,” Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989), es-
pecially when they have become anachronistic, Quill 
504 U.S. at 331 (White, J. concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
We leave it to others to expound the ways in 
which the physical presence standard has proven to 
be unworkable. Dozens of scholarly articles have ad-
dressed the topic. 3  For our part, we contend the 
                                               
2 John A. Swain, Quexit: The Time Has Come, 81 STATE TAX 
NOTES 695 (Aug. 29, 2016). 
3 See, e.g., John A. Swain, Quexit: The Time Has Come, supra; 
H. Beau Baez, Taxing Internet Sales: Trying to Make a Two-
Thousand-Year-Old Jurisdiction Test Work in the Dot-Com 
Economy, 64 TAX LAW. 807 (2011) William Joel Kolarik, II, Un-
tangling Substantial Nexus, 64 TAX LAW. 851 (2011); Richard 
D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, 65 
AM. U. L. REV. 1115 (2016); Walter Hellerstein, Taxing Remote 
Sales In The Digital Age: A Global Perspective, 65 AM. U. L. 




standard has no support under established constitu-
tional principles. If the Court chooses to grant the 
DMA’s petition in this case, it should also grant Col-
orado’s conditional cross-petition to reconsider Quill.  
ARGUMENT 
I.  The result in Quill appears attributable to 
an elevated concern for the mail-order in-
dustry’s reliance interests, faith that the 
physical presence standard would be work-
able, and an expectation that Congress 
would intervene legislatively to address any 
problems.  
Because the Quill Court was not writing on a 
clean slate, it sustained the Commerce Clause hold-
ing in Bellas Hess to accommodate certain concerns, 
creating a physical presence standard as the “nexus” 
requirement for use tax collection. In doing so, it ele-
vated the mail-order industry’s reliance interests 
over other competing interests, disregarding the 
sound constitutional principles which the opinions in 
Quill recognize. The Court’s rationale also reflected 
faith that the physical presence standard would, at 
least, be workable, and if not, the expectation that 
Congress would change it.   
A. The opinions in Quill reflect elevated 
concerns for the mail-order industry’s 
reliance interests compounded by 
questions regarding the retroactive 
effect of overruling Bellas Hess.  
Whether a decision to overrule Bellas Hess should 




la” in Quill. Quill’s petition for writ of certiorari had 
set forth the issue as a separate question from 
whether Bellas Hess remained good law. (“Whether 
the North Dakota Supreme Court may give retroac-
tive effect to its decision, which is contrary to estab-
lished constitutional precedent, to make Quill liable 
for uncollected use taxes back to July 1, 1987?”) The 
Court did not grant certiorari on that issue, Quill, 
504 U.S at 332 (White, J. concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Nonetheless, some Justices ex-
pressed concerns about retroactivity during oral ar-
gument. See Oral Argument, Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, No. 91-194, 1992 WL 687848 (Jan. 22, 1992).  
The Court’s apparent ambivalence is perhaps un-
derstandable. Quill came to the Court amid its reex-
amination of whether its rulings might be given pro-
spective rather than retroactive effect. See James B. 
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991); 
Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 501 U.S. 1247 
(1991)(Harper I); and Harper v. Virginia Dep't of 
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993)(Harper II)(where the 
Court reconsidered its precedent on prospective ap-
plication under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 
97 (1971)). Just a few weeks after Quill, the Court, 
citing Beam, noted the “difficult questions” raised 
when a precedent is overruled retroactively. Allied-
Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 
785-86 (1992). Under Harper II, the Court held that 
its decisions are presumed to have retroactive effect 
when applied to the parties before it. 509 U.S. at 97 
(1993). 
Because the Court did not take up the question of 




opportunity to discuss the contours of that doctrine 
nor to challenge the legitimacy of the industry’s pur-
ported reliance interests including whether leaving 
Bellas Hess in place was necessary to accommodate 
those interests. The majority in Quill could simply 
assert that “it is not unlikely that the mail-order in-
dustry's dramatic growth over the last quarter cen-
tury is due in part to the bright-line exemption from 
state taxation created in Bellas Hess,” Quill, 504 U.S 
at 316, concluding that the “Bellas Hess rule . . . has 
become part of the basic framework of a sizable in-
dustry,” Id. at 317 (emphasis added). Justice White’s 
partial dissent, in contrast, notes that neither Quill 
nor its amici cited any investment decisions that 
would have changed had the mail-order industry be-
lieved Bellas Hess was no longer the rule. Quill at 
331-32.  
Contrary to the Court’s assertion in Quill, the 
growth of the mail-order industry was likely facili-
tated by many things, including the advent of na-
tional credit cards, such as MasterCard and Visa, 
the innovation of the toll-free 800-telephone call, and 
the expansion of the United Parcel Service (UPS) 
and Federal Express.  How much of that growth was 
due to the advantage of not having to collect tax is, 
at best, a tricky empirical question. Richard D. 
Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and 
Quill, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1141 (2016). 
The majority in Quill expressed much less con-
cern for competing interests. Shielding certain 
sellers from tax collection obligations would certainly 
pose economic drawbacks for competitors required to 




stantial tax enforcement problems that would be 
created for the states. But most critically, the major-
ity did not address whether it was reasonable for the 
mail-order industry to have relied so extensively on 
Bellas Hess as to make its holding part of the “foun-
dation” for that industry’s growth. Arguably, such 
reliance would have required the rule in Bellas Hess 
to be frozen in time.  
The Courts in both Bellas Hess and Quill gave no 
indication that they expected that a rule designed to 
protect the reliance interests of a part of a single in-
dustry (mail-order sellers without physical presence) 
would come to constitute the rule for an emerging 
industry built on the Internet. Should this Court de-
cide to overturn Quill, it can do so while respecting 
the reasonable reliance interests of sellers without 
physical presence, which extend to avoiding retroac-
tive liabilities for uncollected taxes. Any retroactive 
liabilities must have two separate causes—the first 
being a decision to overrule Quill, which would be 
presumed to have retroactive effect if it were applied 
to the parties in this case—but need not be so ap-
plied. But the second cause of any retroactive liabili-
ties would be the statutes requiring tax collection 
that might spring into effect in many states after the 
limitation in Quill is removed. Allowing this kind of 
retroactive liability, however, contravenes a long-
established principle that legislative enactments, un-
like this Court’s rulings, are presumed to have pro-
spective effect. This presumption is founded in the 
Due Process Clause, which provides for fair notice 
and repose, interests that may be compromised by 
retroactive legislation. See Landgraf v. USI Film 




overrule Quill, these same “interests in fair notice” 
that underpin this presumption would justify mak-
ing that ruling prospective. Further, if the Court 
found that Quill has become unworkable, holding 
that it continues to apply until the point at which it 
is adjudicated unworkable, rather than applying it 
retroactively, would be consistent with principles of 
stare decisis. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 
(1991)(“[W]hen governing decisions are unworkable 
or are badly reasoned, “this Court has never felt con-
strained to follow precedent.”).  
B. Quill reflects a hope that, despite the 
artificial nature of the physical pres-
ence standard and its failure to em-
body constitutional principles, the 
standard would at least be a workable 
“bright-line” rule.  
The Quill Court clearly put its faith in the practi-
cal workability of the “bright-line” physical-presence 
standard. Our purpose here is not to demonstrate 
the many ways in which, with the advent of electron-
ic commerce, this standard has failed to justify that 
faith. Instead, we demonstrate that the physical-
presence standard cannot be derived from funda-
mental constitutional principles, and if it has become 
unworkable, it need not be sustained as though it 
reflected or embodied those principles.  
The majority in Quill defended the physical pres-
ence standard as a bright-line test despite admitting 
it “appears artificial at its edges.” Quill, 504 U.S at 
315. With hindsight, it is obvious that the artificiali-




beyond “the edges.” Under that standard, a small 
business with a few employees in multiple states will 
have multiple tax collection obligations, whereas a 
much larger Internet seller with no presence in the 
same states will not.  
It is telling that the three opinions in Quill use 
the term “physical presence” a total of 27 times and 
the term “bright-line” 15 times. And yet no precedent 
cited by the Quill Court, including Bellas Hess, uses 
either term. In 1992, the distinction that had been 
made in Bellas Hess between mail-order sellers with 
instate retail offices versus those without, was sim-
ple enough to draw. But there is no evidence the 
Court considered the viability of a physical presence 
standard going forward. See Quill, 504 U.S at 321 
(Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment)(looking only at the period from 1967 to 
1992 for proof that the standard would be workable).  
Even less attention was paid to whether the 
standard was required by constitutional principles. 
This question was raised mainly by the dissents in 
Bellas Hess and Quill. To the dissent in Bellas Hess, 
the line between mail-order sellers with and without 
retail outlets, solicitors, or property was simply not 
grounded in the fundamental constitutional princi-
ple cited by the majority—that a state could impose 
a burden on an out-of-state seller in exchange for the 
benefits it provided if the burden did not exceed that 
imposed on local commerce. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 
765-66. (Fortas, J., dissenting) And it was undenia-
ble that the burden to be imposed on the mail-order 
sellers was no greater than that imposed on other 




ably comparable to other tax and regulatory burdens 
that states could continue to impose on mail-order 
sellers. See DMA II at 1149 (Gorsuch, J. concur-
ring)(citing Quill, 504 U.S at 311-12). 
Justice White, in his partial dissent in Quill, con-
tended that the artificial distinction made in Bellas 
Hess between mail-order sellers was no different 
than similar formalistic rulings in Freeman v. Hewit, 
329 U.S. 249 (1946) and Spector Motor Serv. v. 
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1977), which the Court had 
abandoned as unworkable and unprincipled. Quill, 
504 U.S at 322 (concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Justice White concluded: “The majority clings 
to the physical-presence rule not because of any logi-
cal relation to fairness or any economic rationale re-
lated to principles underlying the Commerce Clause, 
but simply out of the supposed convenience of having 
a bright-line rule.” Id. at 329. It was a “sure bet”, 
said Justice White that “the vagaries of ‘physical 
presence’ will be tested to their fullest in our courts.” 
Id. at 331. Although the concurring opinion dis-
missed these concerns, see Quill, 504 U.S at 320-21 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment), they have been vindicated in the Internet 
age. 
C. Congress’s lack of action on this issue 
does not relieve the Court of its re-
sponsibility. 
By bifurcating the constitutional basis for state 
tax jurisdiction (discussed further in Section II) and 
removing the due process obstacle to Congressional 




whether, when, and to what extent the states may 
burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to 
collect use taxes.” Quill, 504 U.S. at 318. The 
majority admitted this also made its decision easier 
saying “[t]his fact alone” was enough to keep it from 
overturning Bellas Hess “at least for now.” Id. at 
318-19. 
The concurring opinion in Quill expressed a simi-
lar expectation that Congress could change the rule 
of Bellas Hess “by simply saying so.” Id. at 320 (Scal-
ia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). The concurrence also justifies this deci-
sion, saying: “We have long recognized that the doc-
trine of stare decisis has ‘special force’ where ‘Con-
gress remains free to alter what we have done.’” Id. 
As authority for this proposition, however, the con-
currence cites decisions upholding the Court’s earlier 
construction of federal statutes, rather than cases 
involving the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause rul-
ings. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 320 (citing Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-173 
(1989)(42 U.S.C.A. § 1981), Hilton v. South Carolina 
Public Railways Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 
(1991)(the Federal Employers' Liability Act); and Il-
linois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 
(1977)(the Clayton and Sherman Acts)).  
The idea that the Court may “shift to Congress 
the responsibility for perpetuating the Court’s error,” 
see Cleveland v. U.S., 329 U.S. 14, 22 (1946) 
(Rutledge, J. concurring), is problematic. As Justice 
Rutledge underscored in Cleveland, there are “vast 
differences between legislating by doing nothing and 




Congress may fail to take corrective action include 
the sheer pressure of other more important business, 
political considerations, and “a strong and proper 
tendency to trust to the courts to correct their own 
errors.” Id. at 22-23. Further, according to Justice 
Rutledge:  
The danger of imputing to Congress, as a re-
sult of its failure to take positive or affirma-
tive action through normal legislative pro-
cesses, ideas entertained by the Court con-
cerning Congress’ will, is illustrated most 
dramatically perhaps by the vacillating and 
contradictory courses pursued in the long 
line of decisions imputing to ‘the silence of 
Congress’ varied effects in commerce clause 
cases. 
Id. (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).4 See 
also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of 
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 617 (1997)(Thomas, J. dis-
senting)(“treating unenacted congressional intent as 
if it were law would be constitutionally dubious”). 
                                               
4 After Quill, Congress expressed little interest in legislation ad-
dressing this issue until the Senate passed the Marketplace Fair-
ness Act in 2013. That proposal languished in the House and was 
never enacted. Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, S. 743, 113th 
Cong. (2013)  GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bills/113/s743 (last visited May 17, 2016). The bill has been rein-
troduced in the Senate and referred to Committee. Marketplace 
Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. (2015), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-
bill/698/related-bills (last visited May 17, 2016) (providing the 
status of legislation pending in Congress). Similar legislation 




These points are as true today as when Justice 
Rutledge expressed them. 
Today, Congress would face additional hurdles in 
enacting legislation overruling Quill: divergent and 
competing business interests, conflicting state inter-
ests, and the mistaken view by many consumers that 
Internet sales are simply “tax free” and that any tax 
collected would be tantamount to a “new” tax. Con-
gress may be unable to act even if a majority favors 
eliminating the physical presence rule. See also Ed-
ward A. Zelinsky, The Political Process Argument for 
the Supreme Court to Overrule Quill, 82 BROOK. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2017), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2844470 (last visited Oct. 
28, 2016). 
II. To uphold Bellas Hess, the Quill Court took 
the unprecedented step of bifurcating the 
standard for state tax jurisdiction, or “nex-
us.”  
This Section examines Quill’s unprecedented bi-
furcation of the standard for state tax jurisdiction, or 
“nexus,” between the Due Process and Commerce 
Clauses. This was a controversial idea, as acknowl-
edged by Judge Gorsuch below, who described Quill 
in these terms: “Everyone before us acknowledges 
that Quill is among the most contentious of all 
dormant commerce clause cases. Everyone before us 
acknowledges that it’s been the target of criticism 
over many years from many quarters, including from 
many members of the Supreme Court.” DMA II, 814 




No dispute exists that the Commerce Clause im-
poses limitations on state taxing powers in addition 
to what the Due Process Clause imposes. See Quill, 
504 at 305. Prior to Quill, however, the Court had 
little reason to precisely distinguish whether its rul-
ings on state nexus were grounded in one clause or 
the other. See, e.g., Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. 
Dep’t of Revenue of Wash., 419 U.S. 560, 562, 564 
(1975)(referencing both the Due Process Clause and 
the Commerce Clause); Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967)(the “two 
claims are closely related”). In any case, while the 
nexus standard might be based in both the Due Pro-
cess and Commerce Clauses, the Court never held 
that the standard would not be the same under both 
clauses. See, e.g. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of 
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 554 (1977)(stating that: 
“The question presented by this case is whether the 
Society’s activities at the offices in California provid-
ed sufficient nexus . . . as required by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Commerce Clause”); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 304 
(describing Bellas Hess as relying on both the Due 
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause).   
Bifurcating and distinguishing the nexus stand-
ard between the Due Process Clause, which Quill 
satisfied, and the Commerce Clause, which Quill did 
not, served two purposes. By holding that Quill had 
nexus under the Due Process Clause, the Court re-
moved the constitutional obstacle to Congress’s in-
tervention by negating any due process right of “re-
mote” vendors to be free of state use tax collection 
duties. At the same time, however, because Quill had 




collect the North Dakota use tax. This protected the 
mail order industry’s perceived reliance interests. 
This approach of creating a different nexus 
standard under the Due Process Clause from that 
under the Commerce Clause was unprecedented, 
and it came at a high jurisprudential cost. The Court 
sought support for its approach in one case, Com-
plete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 289 
(1977), and that case’s single use of the term “sub-
stantial nexus.” Complete Auto was a Commerce 
Clause case and, according to the Quill Court, the 
use of “substantial nexus,” as opposed to just “nex-
us,” supported a different meaning under the Com-
merce Clause than under the Due Process Clause. As 
leading scholars observed, “the Court’s discovery 
that ‘[d]espite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus 
requirements of the Due Process and Commerce 
Clauses are not identical’ is more accurately viewed 
as a doctrinal epiphany than as a logical inference to 
be drawn from the careful reading of its precedents.” 
See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLER-
STEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 19.02 (3d ed. 2012). Ironi-
cally, in Complete Auto, the question of the nexus 
standard was not even before the Court because the 
taxpayer acknowledged that it was not challenging 
nexus. Complete Auto at 276-78. Anything the Court 
might have said about nexus was merely dicta.  
Also, standing in contrast to Complete Auto’s 
one-time use of “substantial nexus” was the Court’s 
reference to “sufficient nexus” or “sufficiently con-
nected” elsewhere in the opinion. See, e.g., id. at 278, 
285. Additionally, Complete Auto cites cases refer-




texts as a “necessary connection,” id. at 280-81 (cit-
ing Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 271 (1946) 
(Rutledge, J., concurring), or as “sufficient nexus,” 
id. at 285 (citing Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. 
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959)). Complete Auto’s 
one-time use of “substantial nexus” in a case not in-
volving nexus can hardly be read as announcing a 
new Commerce Clause meaning for the concept. In-
deed, the term “substantial nexus” never appears in 
a tax context prior to Complete Auto and had no his-
tory attached to it. And in Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. 
Cal. Bd. of Equalization, decided less than a month 
after Complete Auto, the Court stated:  
The question presented by this case is 
whether the Society’s activities at the offices 
in California provided sufficient nexus be-
tween the out-of-state seller appellant and 
the [s]tate—as required by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Commerce Clause—to support the impo-
sition upon the Society of a use-tax-collection 
liability.  
430 U.S. 551, 554 (1977)(emphasis added). In short, 
it is difficult to believe that the one-time use of the 
term “substantial nexus” in Complete Auto can bear 
the weight Quill put on that term. See also Richard 
D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, 
and Quill, supra, at 1145-47.  
Moreover, formulating a new nexus standard 
based on traditional Commerce Clause principles 
alone is fraught with difficulty. As noted in Section I, 




physical presence in a state is related to the Com-
merce Clause value of limiting state burdens on in-
terstate commerce. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314-15. Accord-
ing to the majority in Quill, the Commerce Clause 
and the substantial nexus requirement reflect struc-
tural concerns about the effects of state regulation 
on the national economy and interstate commerce. 
Id. at 311-13. Yet the majority fails to explain in 
what way the burden on interstate commerce of col-
lecting the use tax is reduced when a mail-order 
seller has property in the state, see Nat’l Geographic 
Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 562 
(1977) (a company’s office in the market state solicit-
ing advertisements for the company’s magazine 
“provide[d] a sufficient nexus” between the company 
and the market state), or when a seller has engaged 
the services of ten part-time, independent contrac-
tors within the state, see Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 
U.S. 207, 211, 213 (1960). See Richard D. Pomp, Re-
visiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, su-
pra, at 1144. And while Justice Rutledge had sug-
gested in his Freeman concurrence that the require-
ment of some local incident might act as a safeguard 
to multiple or duplicative taxation, 329 U.S. at 260-
261, that issue has now been addressed under Com-
plete Auto’s “fair apportionment” prong, see Goldberg 
v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 259-61 (1989).  
Neither in Complete Auto, nor in any other case 
cited by Quill, has the Court found sufficient con-
tacts for due process purposes but an insufficient 
nexus under the Commerce Clause. Quill, 504 U.S. 
at 325 (White, J. concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). And not since Quill has the Court seen a 




Due Process and Commerce Clauses. Moreover, the 
lower courts have generally interpreted Quill nar-
rowly, even in the state tax context. See John A. 
Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurispru-
dential and Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 321 (2003)(chronicling how the physical pres-
ence standard was not adopted in the corporate in-
come tax context and the policy and other reasons 
for distinguishing Quill).  
As Judge Gorsuch noted in his concurrence in 
DMA II, “[i]t may be rare for Supreme Court prece-
dents to suffer as highly a ‘distinguished’ fate . . .” 
DMA II, 814 F.3d at 1150. But the explanation for 
that fate is simple: Quill adds nothing substantive to 
the constitutional framework that undergirds state 
tax nexus. As a decision resulting from expediency, 






In 2015, Justice Kennedy described Quill as 
“questionable even when decided” and said it “should 
be left in place only if a powerful showing can be 
made that its rationale is still correct.” DMA I, 135 
S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (concurring opinion). As we have 
argued here, the rationale for Quill was one driven 
entirely by practical concerns, rather than constitu-
tional principles. Justice Kennedy also expressed the 
view that “[t] he legal system should find an appro-
priate case for this Court to reexamine Quill and 
Bellas Hess.” Id. If the Court determines it is neces-
sary to accept the DMA’s petition for certiorari, it 
should not wait to reexamine Quill in some later 
case, but should accept Colorado’s cross-petition.  
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